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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Spencer Newell Breese appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to trafficking in marijuana. On appeal, Breese challenges
the denial of his motion to suppress.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Breese with trafficking in marijuana after a Greyhound
bus employee found several baggies of marijuana in Breese’s checked bag. (R.,
pp.6-7, 18-19.) Breese filed a motion to suppress, asserting his “backpack was
illegally searched without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that
a crime had been committed.”1

(R., pp.24-25.)

The court denied Breese’s

motion after which Breese entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to
appeal the district court’s suppression decision.

(R., pp.90-98.)

The court

imposed a fixed one-year sentence. (R., pp.100-103.) Breese timely appealed
from the judgment. (R., pp.109-110.)

1

In his motion, Breese also asserted he was “interrogated while in custody
without being informed of his Fifth Amendment Miranda rights” (R., p.25), but he
withdrew that claim at the suppression hearing (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2).
1

ISSUE
Breese states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Breese’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Breese failed to show error in the district court’s conclusions that
Breese was not entitled to suppression because the Greyhound bus employee
was not acting as an agent of law enforcement when he searched Breese’s bag
and, even if acting as an agent of law enforcement, the search was proper under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement?

2

ARGUMENT
Breese Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress
Because The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Greyhound Bus
Employee Who Searched Breese’s Bag Was Not Acting As An Agent Of Law
Enforcement And, Even If He Was, The Search Was Proper Under The
Automobile Exception
A.

Introduction
Breese challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the

district court erred in concluding that the Greyhound bus employee who
searched Breese’s bag was not acting as an agent of law enforcement and, even
if he was, the search was proper under the automobile exception. (Appellant’s
Brief, pp.5-15.) The law and the evidence presented at the suppression hearing
support both of the district court’s conclusions.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. Colvin,
157 Idaho 881, 882, 341 P.3d 598, 599 (Ct. App. 2014).

3

C.

The Search Of Breese’s Bag Was Not Protected By The Fourth
Amendment Because It Was Not Conducted By Law Enforcement Or An
Agent Of Law Enforcement
It is well-settled that the Fourth Amendment applies to state actors, not

private parties, “unless government officials instigated the search or otherwise
participated in a wrongful search.” State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 517, 887 P.2d
57, 62 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).

Thus, a search by an individual

employed by a common carrier, “on its own initiative, for its own purposes, is
normally considered a private (and not a governmental) search” that does not
“giv[e] rise to Fourth Amendment protections.” United States v. Gomez, 614
F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).

“The burden of proving

governmental involvement in a search conducted by a private citizen rests on the
party objecting to the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). The district court correctly
concluded that the search of Breese’s bag by a Greyhound bus employee did
not implicate the Fourth Amendment because the employee was not acting as a
government agent when he conducted the search. (R., pp.79-83.)
The district court made the following factual findings based on the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing:
On April 28, 2015, Ward Eversull, a Greyhound employee,
was arranging luggage in the luggage compartment of a bus which
had just arrived in Boise from Portland, Oregon. The luggage
compartment, which is underneath the bus, is organized into six
bins. State’s Exh. B. Mr. Eversull was removing from the bins the
baggage belonging to passengers disembarking in Boise and
rearranging the remaining baggage among the bins according to
upcoming destinations. As he was moving a backpack destined for
Salt Lake City to a different bin, he noted the strong odor of
marijuana emanating from the backpack. Mr. Eversull testified he
recognized the odor as marijuana because it was a [sic] “very
distinctive . . . like a skunk.” He further testified about his familiarity
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with the smell of marijuana as a result of his employment with
Greyhound. He stated that he has had “several” occasions to smell
the odor of marijuana in baggage over the past few years and his
observations have been repeatedly confirmed by law enforcement
investigations and his own searches of baggage. [2] In addition, Mr.
Eversull knew the bus had just arrived from Oregon, where
marijuana is legal.
Based on his observations, Eversull locked the baggage
compartment with the backpack inside and contacted police
dispatch. He specifically asked for “Officer Wall and his dogs” but
was told Officer Wall was not available. He then asked for another
canine unit, reporting his discovery and explaining that the bus was
due to depart for Salt Lake City in ten to fifteen minutes. Def’s Exh.
C.
Greyhound policy prohibits passengers from utilizing the
carrier to transport illegal substances and puts passengers on
notice of this prohibition. Greyhound further warns its passengers
that their “belongings and packages” are subject to being searched
at any time. Such notices are prominently posted at the ticketing
counters and doors within Greyhound stations as well as in each
passenger’s ticketing envelopes. State’s Exh. A. Eversull testified
that if illegal substances are discovered during a search of
passenger luggage, he revokes the passenger’s ticket to prevent
continued travel with illegal substances on board.
Although Greyhound policy gave Mr. Eversull a right to
search Defendant’s backpack without the presence of law
enforcement, he testified that he wanted an officer present during
[the] search for three reasons. First, he noted his other employees
were inside the terminal taking care of customers at the time.
Second, he testified that he wanted law enforcement to be there
3
because he is “never sure what the quantity is going to be.”[ ]
Third, the arrival of law enforcement, especially the canine unit,
provides some degree of entertainment for the passengers and
breaks up the routine of Eversull’s day. Mr. Eversull is not

2

In a footnote, the district court noted it previously “heard testimony from
Eversull relating to one such incident in the case of State v. Lovely, CR-FE-20140004550.” (R., p.77 n.2.)
3

In another footnote, the district stated: “Implicit in Eversull’s statement is his
discomfort if presented with a situation where he, as a private citizen, is in
possession of a large amount of illegal contraband.” (R., p.78 n.3.)
5

compensated by law enforcement or by Greyhound for discovering
illegal substances.
When Cpl. Kent Lipple arrived at the Greyhound station,
Eversull explained his findings and showed him the backpack in the
luggage compartment, which was sitting on top of the pile of
luggage in one of the bins. Eversull explained to Cpl. Lipple that he
wanted him to be a “witness” as Eversull searched the backpack,
which he told Cpl. Lipple he had “a legal right” to do. Cpl. Lipple
stood outside the open door to the compartment behind Eversull
while Eversull pointed out the backpack which was located right
inside the door. Cpl. Lipple then leaned over slightly to see if he
could detect the odor of marijuana, which he could not. Eversull,
however, could still smell the odor. While Cpl. Lipple passively
observed, Eversull then picked up the backpack and manipulated
the outside of it, stating, “I feel something right here.” Eversull
proceeded to open the backpack and reach in, stating, “I’ve got my
hands on it.” Eversull then pulled out three bags of a green leafy
substance which he determined to be marijuana. Cpl. Lipple then
instructed Eversull to put the bags back into the backpack. At no
point prior to or during the search did Cpl. Lipple instruct Eversull to
either search or stop searching [the] bag, nor did Cpl. Lipple touch
the backpack or physically enter the compartment.
(R., pp.77-78.)
In rejecting Breese’s argument that Eversull was acting as a state agent
when he searched Breese’s bag, the district court noted the two-factor test, cited
by the Court of Appeals in Kopsa, which requires consideration of “(1)
government knowledge and acquiescence, and (2) the private party’s intent in
making the search.” (R., p.80 (quoting Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at
62).) With respect to the first factor, the district court found Corporal Lipple’s
“participation in the search was minimal” and Corporal Lipple did not “direct or
encourage Eversull to search the backpack or touch the backpack himself.” (R.,
p.82.) Regarding the second factor, the district court found “Eversull’s primary
motivation for conducting the search was to pursue Greyhound’s interest in
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deterring the transportation of illegal or dangerous substances,” and Eversull
“was acting in accordance with Greyhound policy by searching the backpack
when he formed the independent belief that an illegal substance was, in fact,
being transported.” (R., p.82.)
Breese contends the district court erred in applying both factors from
Kopsa to the evidence presented in this case. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-10.) First,
Breese argues that because Corporal Lipple “accepted the search and allowed it
to happen,” his conduct satisfies the dictionary definition of “acquiescence” and,
therefore, satisfies the first factor from Kopsa.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-8.)

Breese’s argument fails because it is premised upon how the dictionary defines
“acquiescence” rather than the meaning behind the word as it is used in the
context of the two-factor test. “Knowledge and acquiescence” for purposes of
deciding whether a private individual is acting as a state agent contemplates a
circumstance in which the “government [is] involved either directly as a
participant or indirectly as an encourager of the private citizen’s actions.” Kopsa,
126 Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at 62. The cases applying the Kopsa test illustrate
what is required in order to satisfy the first factor and support the conclusion that
more than mere presence is required.
For example, in Kopsa, a Horizon Airlines employee at the airport in
Portland, Oregon, opened a suspicious package and “found a white powdery
substance.” 126 Idaho at 516, 887 P.2d at 61. After discovering the contraband,
the Horizon employee called a detective with the Portland Airport Interagency
Narcotics Team, also known as “PAINT.” Id. The PAINT detective coordinated
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with law enforcement in Boise, where the package was to be delivered, and a
controlled delivery was arranged between law enforcement and Kopsa, to whom
the package was addressed. Id. “In support of her contention that the airline
employee acted as an agent of the state,” Kopsa argued that such a relationship
existed because “PAINT agents introduced themselves to airline employees,
handed out business cards to them, and left stacks of ‘profile sheets’ on the
counters, which the employees would sometimes pass around.” Id. at 517, 887
P.2d at 62. Kopsa also “point[ed] out that PAINT had previously given rewards
of $100-200 to airline employees who provided PAINT with packages containing
controlled substances.” Id. “However, the airline employee testified that she did
not receive any training from PAINT regarding the discovery of drugs,” “she
never saw PAINT’s profile sheet,” and, although she was aware of the past
rewards, “she had no expectation of receiving a payment when she opened the
package,” and “in opening the package, she was simply doing her duty as a
citizen.” Id. (quotations and alteration omitted). The Idaho Court of Appeals held
“that the government’s involvement in the search of Kopsa’s package was too
attenuated to convert the airline employee into an agent of the state.” Kopsa,
126 Idaho at 518, 887 P.2d at 63.

Accordingly, “the employee’s search of

Kopsa’s package was a private search” that did not implicate Kopsa’s Fourth
Amendment rights. Id.
In Gomez, the Ninth Circuit also rejected a claim of agency where an
airport police officer was present when an airline employee searched a suitcase
in order to determine the owner’s identity. 614 F.2d at 644-645. In that case, an
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airline employee was trying to open a suitcase that appeared to have fallen from
a conveyor belt so he could “determine the identity of the owner, but when he
had difficulty with the lock, one of the officers said that it merely needed to be
tapped.”

Gomez, 614 F.2d at 644.

The officer then “tapped or kicked the

mechanism and it released the lock.” Id. Once the suitcase was opened by the
airline employee, he and the officers could see “a revolver and many small
packages wrapped in contact paper.” Id. “The supervisor turned the suitcase
over to the police” whose “further search (now prompted by discovery of the gun)
disclosed that the packages contained 23 pounds of 70% cocaine, having a
street value in the millions of dollars.” Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected Gomez’s
claim that the search was governmental, stating:
The evidence supports the district judge’s finding that the
decision to initiate the search was that of the airline employee, and
his implicit conclusion that it was a private search when it was
initiated.
Appellant suggests that it thereafter became a
governmental search by the presence of the officers and their
observation of the airline employee’s actions. We reject that
contention.
But in this case there was more than mere
observation. One of the officers tapped the suitcase and thus
assisted the airline employee, at least to that extent. Given the
express findings of the district judge as to the motivation for the
search, and his finding that the suitcase was opened by the airline
employee pursuant to that motivation, we are not inclined to hold
that this slight “participation” by the officer converted the clearly
private search into a governmental one. The officers testified that
they were present out of an interest in helping the airline and they
were admittedly curious. The record contains no evidence that
even suggests that they had information to suspect that the
suitcase contained contraband and there is no evidence to suggest
that they knew the owner. We are not disposed to hold, on the
facts of this case, that their presence and conduct constituted [sic]
the search a governmental one, so as to bring into play the
exclusionary rule.
Gomez, 614 F.2d at 645.
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United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1994), on the other hand,
illustrates a circumstance in which a private person may be found to be acting
with “government knowledge and acquiescence” for purposes of finding agency
under the Fourth Amendment. In Reed, law enforcement was contacted by a
hotel manager who reported his suspicions that Reed, a hotel guest, was using
his room for drug activity. 15 F.3d at 929. Officers responded to the hotel and
accompanied the manager to Reed’s room where the manager “used his master
key to enter.” Id. at 930. One of the officers “accompanied” the manager “‘ten
feet’ into the room to assure his safety.” Id. While there was contraband visible
in plain view, the room was otherwise “clean and in good condition.”

Id.

“Nonetheless,” the manager “proceeded to go through dresser drawers and to
open Reed’s latched briefcase. Although the officers did not ask him to conduct
this search, they stood guard in the doorway and listened” as the manager
“described his finds.” Id. Applying the first factor of the two-factor test recited in
Kopsa, the Ninth Circuit found the factor satisfied because the officers “definitely
‘knew of and acquiesced’ in [the] search.” Reed, 15 F.3d at 931. The court
elaborated: “They were personally present during the search, knew exactly what
[the manager] was doing as he was doing it, and made no attempt to discourage
him from examining Reed’s personal belongings beyond what was required to
protect hotel property.” Id. Pertinent to this conclusion was the knowledge of
and acquiescence in conduct that was “unreasonable” or improper, i.e., “beyond
what was required to protect hotel property.” Id. That the reasonableness or
lawfulness of a challenged search is a consideration in this context is consistent
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with the general law that the Fourth Amendment “prohibit[s] unreasonable
intrusions by private individuals who are acting as government instruments or
agents.” Id. As noted in Kopsa, “It is firmly established that evidence obtained
through a private search, even though wrongfully conducted, is not excludable
under the fourth amendment unless governmental officials instigated the search
or otherwise participated in a wrongful search.” 126 Idaho at 517, 887 P.2d at
62. Thus, if law enforcement instigates a search or participates in a wrongful
search, a finding that the first factor is satisfied may be appropriate. Such a
finding is not appropriate in this case because the search of Breese’s bag was
neither instigated by Corporal Lipple nor otherwise wrongful.
Breese does not contend, nor could he, that Corporal Lipple instigated the
search of Breese’s bag. Corporal Lipple was only present during the search at
Eversull’s request and the court’s findings that Corporal Lipple did not “direct or
encourage Eversull to search the backpack or touch the backpack himself” (R.,
p.82) are undisputed.

Eversull also does not, and could not, dispute that

Greyhound’s policy authorized the search of the bag.

(State’s Exhibit A.)

Indeed, Corporal Lipple had no authority to prevent Eversull from doing precisely
what Greyhound policy allowed him to do.

Any “acquiescence” by Corporal

Lipple was, therefore, not legally meaningful and did not convert the nature of
the search to a governmental one.

Breese’s claim that it was “sufficient for
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acquiescence” for Corporal Lipple to “accept[ ] the search and allow[ ] it to
4
happen” is without merit. (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)

Breese’s claim that the district court erred in rejecting a finding of agency
under the second factor also lacks merit. Breese argues that the district court’s
finding regarding Eversull’s motives for searching Breese’s bag “is contradicted
by Mr. Eversull’s testimony at the suppression hearing.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)
According to Breese, “[i]t is clear” from Eversull’s testimony that he “intended to
assist law enforcement in searching Mr. Breese’s backpack” because Eversull
testified that he wanted law enforcement present when he opened the backpack
because he is “never sure what the quantity is,” which makes a “difference” with
respect to what law enforcement is “going to do with it.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.89 (quoting Tr., p.37, L.16 – p.38, L.3).) Why Breese wanted law enforcement
present when he conducted the search is a different question than why he
conducted the search in the first instance.

Eversull conducted the search

“because Greyhound reserves the right to search any bag at any time,” and
Eversull searched Breese’s bag in particular because it smelled like it contained
marijuana. (Tr., p.18, Ls.13-16, p.21, Ls.12-15.) The search was consistent with
Greyhound’s “zero tolerance” policy, which prohibits illegal substances from

4

Breese’s argument in this regard is also poor policy. If an employee of a
common carrier intends to conduct a search pursuant to a policy authorizing
such a search, the safest course of action would be to have law enforcement
available at the outset to manage the contraband discovered, as well as its
owner, rather than require the employee to wait until after the search is
conducted before calling for assistance.
12

being on its “premises or on the bus.” (State’s Exhibit A, p.2.)
Contrary to Breese’s claim, Eversull’s testimony, and the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing, supports the conclusion that Eversull’s
intent in searching Breese’s bag was pursuant to Greyhound policy and not for
the purpose of assisting law enforcement. Compare Kopsa, supra, and United
States v. Humphrey, 549 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted) (“While
a private motive need not be lawful or legitimate in order to render a search or
seizure nongovernmental, the existence of a legitimate motive . . . makes it
unlikely that an allegation of a private motive is merely a subterfuge.”).
Breese has failed to show error in the district court’s conclusion that
Eversull’s search of Breese’s bag did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
D.

Even If Eversull Was Acting As An Agent Of Law Enforcement, The
Search Of Breese’s Bag Was Justified By Probable Cause To Believe It
Contained Contraband And No Warrant Was Required Pursuant To The
Automobile Exception
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.

“A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”

State v.

Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); see also State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999)). One such exception is the
“automobile exception,” which authorizes a warrantless search of a vehicle and
the containers therein when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle
contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity. California v. Acevedo, 500
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U.S. 565, 572 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982); State
v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999); State v. Lovely, 159
Idaho 675, 365 P.3d 431 (Ct. App. 2016). The automobile exception applies to
common carriers like a Greyhound bus. Lovely, 159 Idaho at 433-434, 365 P.3d
at ___. “Probable cause is established if the facts available to the officer at the
time of the search would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that
the area or items to be searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime.”
State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007)
(citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 823).

“If probable cause justifies the search of a

lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its
contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case supports
the district court’s conclusion that the search of Breese’s bag was justified under
the automobile exception based on probable cause to believe that Breese’s bag,
which was stored in the bus, contained marijuana.

(R., pp.83-86.)

Breese

claims otherwise, arguing that “[t]he fact that Mr. Eversull allegedly smelled
marijuana did not establish probable cause for the search because Mr. Eversull
was not trained in drug detection and because Officer Lipple did not detect an
odor of marijuana.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-11.) Breese’s argument fails for
several reasons.
First, Eversull did not “allegedly” smell marijuana, he in fact smelled it, and
the district court found as much. (R., p.86.)
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Second, it is unclear what Breese means when he complains that Eversull
was “not trained in drug detection” or what training he believes is required in
order to be able to detect the odor of marijuana.

Eversull testified that he

recognizes the odor of marijuana “[b]ecause marijuana has a very distinct odor to
it.” (Tr., p.34, Ls.17-20; see also p.36, Ls.13-16.) Eversull also testified that, on
prior occasions, his suspicion that a bag contained marijuana based on its smell
has been confirmed by his own searches and by deployment of a drug dog. (Tr.,
p.36, Ls.5-9.)

Eversull’s testimony was more than adequate to provide

foundation for his belief that Breese’s bag contained marijuana.

See United

States v. Pond, 523 F.2d 210, 211-212 (2nd Cir. 1975) (“reliable informant’s
detection of marijuana using his sense of smell alone” was sufficient to provide
probable cause for a search warrant).
Moreover, as noted by the district court, Breese “did not object to
Eversull’s testimony or challenge Eversull’s observations, nor his past
experiences successfully identifying marijuana and his ultimate testimony that he
recognized the smell coming from the backpack as marijuana.” (R., p.86.) To
the extent Breese is trying to make a foundation objection for the first time on
appeal, it is not preserved and this Court should decline to consider it. Slack v.
Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 922, 104 P.3d 958, 964 (2004) (“Because Kelleher did
not object on the ground that there was no foundation showing that the dirt road
was a safer route open for public use, we will not consider that objection on
appeal.”).
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Third, to the extent Breese is arguing, as he did below, that, as a matter of
law, the odor of marijuana must be detected by a member of law enforcement in
order to establish probable cause, even when the defendant is making a claim of
agency, such an argument is without merit. Two established legal principles
support this conclusion: (1) “The smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the
probable cause requirement for a warrantless search,” State v. Gonzales, 117
Idaho 518, 519, 789 P.2d 206, 207 (Ct. App. 1990) (quotations and citations
omitted, emphasis original); and (2) law enforcement may rely on information
provided by citizens for purposes of establishing probable cause, State v. Van
Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted).
The second principle is even more significant when a defendant, like Breese, is
claiming that the citizen is acting as an agent of law enforcement. If Eversull’s
acts are going to be attributable to law enforcement, his experience in detecting
marijuana should be as well. This is especially true where, as here, the evidence
in the record is that Eversull had experience in detecting the odor of marijuana,
but there is no evidence regarding Corporal Lipple’s training or experience in this
regard. Nevertheless, Breese asks this Court to reject the evidence that Eversull
could smell marijuana, and had a greater opportunity to detect the odor than did
Corporal Lipple (R., p.86 n.10) in favor of an assumption that Corporal Lipple
had relevant training and experience and a superior marijuana-smelling ability to
Eversull in order to take advantage of Corporal Lipple’s initial inability to detect
the odor. Breese’s request to decide this case on such an assumption is not
only inconsistent with the legal principles set forth above, it is inconsistent with
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appellate standards of review. See State v. Vierra, 125 Idaho 465, 468, 872
P.2d 728, 731 (Ct. App. 1994) (noting appellate review “is limited to the
evidence, theories and arguments that were presented to the trial court below”).
The district court correctly concluded that, even if Eversull was acting as
an agent of law enforcement, there was probable cause, based on Eversull’s
detection of the odor of marijuana, to support the search of Breese’s bag, and
the search of the bag was permissible pursuant to the automobile exception.
Breese has failed to show any error in this conclusion, or any other conclusion
made in relation to the denial of his motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the
district court’s order denying Breese’s motion to suppress.
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2016.
_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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